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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










TROOPER PRESTYN K. SHOWERS, in their individual capacities;  
TROOPER TIMOTHY M. WESESKY, in their individual capacities 
 
                  Thomas A. Wood, 
 
                                        Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 4-16-cv-01923) 
District Judge:  Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
____________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 24, 2020 
 
Before:  PHIPPS, RENDELL, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 







* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
Thomas Wood appeals a jury verdict that rejected his excessive force claims 
against two Pennsylvania State Troopers.  Wood sued those troopers for their role in 
‘bear hugging’ him and taking him to the ground after he, a diabetic in a suicidal state, 
had overdosed on insulin in the middle of the night and refused to get in an ambulance.  
As a result of that encounter, Wood sustained a broken ankle, which required several 
surgeries, and he sought at least $150,000 in compensatory damages along with punitive 
damages.  To prove his case, Wood retained an expert witness to testify that the troopers’ 
use of force was greater than required for a non-threatening citizen and that, had the 
troopers followed crisis management techniques, Wood would have avoided injury.  The 
troopers moved to exclude the expert from testifying, and the District Court issued an 
order granting that motion.  Wood now challenges that order.   
As a case under a federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of 
the Fourth Amendment, this action was within the District Court’s original jurisdiction.  
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3).  In exercising jurisdiction over a timely appeal of a 
final judgment, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we will affirm the judgment because the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered expert testimony.  See Gen. 
Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1997); see also Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 
520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008). 
I 
To support his excessive force claims against the troopers, Wood retained an 
independent consulting criminologist and professor emeritus, Dr. R. Paul McCauley, as 
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an expert witness.  Dr. McCauley produced an expert report in which he recounted the 
facts as he understood them.  From there, that report set forth the legal framework 
established by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), for 
evaluating excessive force claims.  The report also reviewed the use-of-force policies 
from the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the National Institute of 
Justice, but the report contained no explanation about those organizations or how they 
formulated their use-of-force standards.  Under those organizations’ standards, the report 
explained, the troopers did not use accepted crisis-management tactics, and if they would 
have done so, they could have de-escalated the situation without resorting to the use of 
force.  Ultimately, according to the report, Dr. McCauley would have testified that taking 
Wood to the ground was unreasonable under the Graham factors and the use-of-force 
policies published by those two organizations.   
Before trial began, the troopers moved in limine to prevent Dr. McCauley from 
testifying, and the District Court granted that motion.  The District Court reasoned that 
although Federal Rule of Evidence 704 permits testimony on ultimate issues, Dr. 
McCauley’s proposed testimony about the law was inadmissible because it would 
“merely tell the jury what result to reach.”  Slip Op. at 3 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 704 
advisory committee note).  In further explanation, the District Court determined that the 
testimony about policies promulgated by organizations other that the Pennsylvania State 
Police would not fit the issues in the case, which concerned the conduct of two state 
troopers.  Slip Op. at 4.  As part of its analysis, the District Court visited the website of 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police to learn about the organization.  See Slip 
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Op. at 4.   
 Wood argues that the District Court erred in six respects.  His two primary 
challenges assert that the District Court erred by excluding Dr. McCauley’s testimony 
because it (i) substituted its own judgment for the standards upon which an expert could 
rely and (ii) improperly excluded evidence on the use of force against an emotionally 
disturbed person.  Wood also argues that the District Court erred as a matter of 
procedure by (iii) conducting internet research about the International Association of the 
Chiefs of Police to make a credibility determination.  Finally, Wood contends that the 
District Court erred by making three new rules of law: (iv) that expert testimony in 
reliance on the standards from the International Association of the Chiefs of Police is 
inadmissible; (v) that to qualify as an expert on a trooper’s conduct, the expert must have 
knowledge of the procedures that govern the Pennsylvania State Police; and (vi) that 
different standards apply to the troopers’ conduct than municipal police officers.   
II 
A 
At the core of Wood’s first two challenges is the question of whether an expert 
may testify about the application of legal standards or other policies to the facts before 
the jury.   
The rule against testimony on governing law partially answers that question.  It is 
the province of a judge – not an expert witness – to instruct a jury about governing law.  
See Berckeley Inv. Grp. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 217 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that “the 
District Court must ensure that an expert does not testify as to the governing law of the 
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case . . . because it would usurp the District Court’s pivotal role in explaining the law to 
the jury”); United States v. Leo, 941 F.2d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that “it is 
not permissible for a witness to testify as to the governing law since it is the district 
court’s duty to explain the law to the jury”).  Because Dr. McCauley sought to testify 
about the application of the Graham factors, which govern excessive-force claims, the 
District Court did not err in excluding that component of his testimony.   
 But Dr. McCauley sought to testify about more than just the Graham factors.  He 
was prepared to share his conclusions that the troopers’ conduct fell short of standards 
promulgated by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the National 
Institute of Justice.  Unlike testimony regarding governing law, that kind of testimony 
may be permitted if its proponent meets the burden of establishing its admissibility.  See 
Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 417-18 (3d Cir. 1999).  Procedurally, in a 
civil case, a retained expert must produce a report providing a “complete statement of all 
opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(2)(B)(i).  Substantively, an expert must be qualified and offer reliable testimony 
that fits the case.  See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 
579, 589-91 (1993).  The reliability of an expert’s conclusions and opinions hinges on the 
reliability of the expert’s methodology.  See Fed. R. Evid. 702(c) (requiring expert 
testimony to be “the product of reliable principles and methods”). 
 In light of those principles, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding the remainder of Dr. McCauley’s proposed testimony.  His expert report did 
not establish the reliability of the policies promulgated by the International Association of 
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Chiefs of Police or the National Institute of Justice.  It did not describe those 
organizations, the process by which they developed their standards, or the general 
acceptance of those standards.  Without that information or other evidence of reliability, 
see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95, Dr. McCauley did not provide a basis for concluding 
that his proposed testimony was the product of reliable principles and methods for 
determining whether an officer used excessive force.  And absent such a showing, his 
proposed testimony was correctly excluded.   
The Dissenting Opinion characterizes this conclusion as the product of a 
“rigorous, inflexible approach.”  Dissent Op. at 3.  Instead, the Dissent conceives of a 
much lower bar for expert testimony, one where “flaws in [an expert’s] testimony,” such 
as the reliability of an expert’s principles and methods, would be primarily a question for 
the jury and would not be screened by the trial judge.  See id.  But that is not the legal 
standard.  In Daubert, the Supreme Court explained that while a trial judge has flexibility 
in assessing an expert witness’s reliability, “[t]he focus, of course, must be solely on 
principles and methodology . . . .”  509 U.S. at 595; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158-59 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]rial-court 
discretion in choosing the manner of testing expert reliability . . . is not discretion to 
abandon the gatekeeping function . . . [and] it is not discretion to perform the function 
inadequately.”).  Lest that admonition go unheeded, the amendments to Rule 702 added 
four conditions for expert testimony – two of which specifically address “principles and 
methods.”  Fed. R. Evid. 702(c)-(d); see also Amendments to the Rules of Federal 
Evidence, H.R. 154 Doc. No. 106-225, at 41-53 (2000).  Most relevant here is the 
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requirement in Rule 702(c) that expert testimony be “the product of reliable principles 
and methods.”  Fed. R. Evid. 702(c).  And yet Dr. McCauley’s report did not provide any 
background on the two organizations that developed policing standards; the report did not 
explain the methods by which those organizations developed those standards; it did not 
address whether those standards were ever tested or subjected to peer review; nor did it 
comment on the general acceptance of those standards.  A trial judge does not abuse his 
or her discretion by excluding testimony from an expert whose methodology lacks so 
many indicia of reliability.   
Rather than confront those omissions, the Dissent accepts Dr. McCauley’s reliable 
application of those two organizations’ policing standards to this case, see Dissent Op. 
at 2.  But satisfying that requirement, see Fed. R. Evid. 702(d), does not cure the 
deficiencies in Dr. McCauley’s methodology as this Circuit long ago explained, “any step 
that renders the analysis unreliable under the Daubert factors renders the expert’s 
testimony inadmissible.”  In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
B 
Perhaps due to the critical deficiencies in the expert report, the District Court 
visited the webpage of the International Association of Chiefs of Police to learn about the 
organization.  Wood argues that doing so was improper because it was not the judge’s 
role to make credibility determinations.  That contention fails.  Evaluating the reliability 
of an expert’s methodology is not a credibility determination but a critical gatekeeping 
function for judges – not juries – to perform.  See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147 
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(explaining that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposes a special obligation upon a trial 
judge to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony . . .  is not only relevant, but 
reliable” (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589)); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 
(explaining that a trial judge must make “a preliminary assessment of whether the 
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether 
that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue”). 
Nonetheless, as gatekeepers, judges do not have free rein to consider internet 
content – even information about an organization from its own homepage.  Rather, sua 
sponte judicial research on a question of fact must still meet the standard for judicial 
notice, which requires an absence of a “reasonable dispute” about the fact.  Fed. R. 
Evid. 201(b); cf. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (“[T]he trial judge must have considerable 
leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular 
expert testimony is reliable.”).  But here, the outcome of that inquiry – the propriety of 
judicially noticing facts from an organization’s online profile – is inconsequential.  Dr. 
McCauley failed to establish the reliability of his methods, and his opinions were not 
admissible. 
C 
Finally, by arguing that the District Court incorrectly established three new rules 
of law, Wood takes on too much.  A district court cannot issue decisions of binding 
precedential weight, and thus the District Court’s orders in this case are just that – rulings 
applied to the facts of one case.  See, e.g., Farley v. Farley, 481 F.2d 1009, 1012 (3d Cir. 
1973) (noting that a district court’s decision does not create binding precedent).  And 
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under an abuse of discretion standard, inconsistencies between evidentiary rulings among 
district courts are not fatal, or even unexpected: as long as their decisions are not 
“manifestly erroneous,” district courts may make contrary evidentiary rulings in different 
cases.  Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141-42.  Of course, certain errors, such as a “clearly erroneous 
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact,” 
uniformly constitute an abuse of discretion.  Pineda, 520 F.3d at 243 (quoting In re TMI 
Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 666 (3d Cir. 1999)).  But no such error is present here; Dr. 
McCauley did not meet his burden of establishing a reliable methodology for his expert 
testimony. 
* * * 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
 
Thomas Wood and Melissa Wood v. Trooper Prestyn K. Showers and  
Trooper Timothy M. Wesesky 
No. 19-3267 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: 
The Majority concludes that the District Court simply fulfilled its role as gatekeeper.  
I disagree.  In my view, the relatively low threshold requirement for the admissibility of 
expert testimony was satisfied in these circumstances, and the District Court went well 
beyond its gatekeeping role in conducting independent internet research without notice to 
the parties and relying on it in declaring the testimony inadmissible.  Because I would find 
that the District Court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. McCauley’s testimony 
regarding proper police procedures, I respectfully dissent.1   
 
1 I agree with the Majority’s conclusion that the District Court correctly barred Dr. 
McCauley’s testimony to the extent that he offered views concerning the application of 
the Graham factors to the excessive force claim, which would have essentially been a 




We generally take a “liberal approach to admitting expert testimony” and have 
“eschewed imposing overly rigorous requirements of expertise.”  Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. 
S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 781, 782 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 
717, 732 (3d Cir. 1994).  Indeed, expert testimony should be admitted as long as there is a 
“logical basis for an expert’s opinion testimony.”  Breidor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 
F.2d 1134, 1138-39 (3d Cir. 1983).   
Here, a logical basis supported Dr. McCauley’s testimony.  He reviewed the case 
materials, analyzed the facts, and referred to the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP) model policies and procedures to support his conclusion that the defendant 
officer did not act appropriately in responding to this non-criminal medical-assist police 
call.  Dr. McCauley provided an overview of proper police protocol in medical-assist 
situations involving emotionally distressed persons and emphasized that, here, the plaintiff 
was nonthreatening and potentially suicidal.  Applying the IACP model procedures, Dr. 
 
related to proper police procedures, could have provided helpful information to the jury 




McCauley concluded that the defendant ignored widely accepted police procedures by 
using physical force before attempting to de-escalate the situation.  
Because there was a logical basis for Dr. McCauley to refer to model police 
procedures to explain the de-escalation practices officers should follow in medical-assist 
situations, and because that information could have been helpful for the jury to understand 
the appropriate actions for police officers to take in such situations, the testimony should 
have been admitted.  See United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1344 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The 
test of Rule 702 is whether the testimony will assist the jury.”).  Indeed, we have declined 
to “automatically discount . . . [the] presumption[] . . . that official police department 
policies may be considered among other things in the reasonableness inquiry.”  Johnson v. 
City of Phila., 837 F.3d 343, 351 (3d Cir. 2016).  Courts must take a practical approach to 
admitting expert testimony and apply the standards of admissibility flexibly based upon 
the facts of the case and the complexity of the issue.  See Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, 
LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 81 (3d Cir. 2017); Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  This was not the type of issue where a jury must heavily rely upon the expert’s 




application of model police procedures to the officer’s use of force.  Thus, the rigorous, 
inflexible approach taken by the Majority in critiquing Dr. McCauley’s “methodology” is 
misplaced.  Any flaws in his testimony could have been pursued on cross-examination and 
assessed by the jury. 
Further, I find that the District Court abused its discretion when it conducted 
independent internet research—without providing notice to the parties or providing the 
parties an opportunity to address this research—and relied upon that research to completely 
exclude Dr. McCauley’s testimony.  Based on the internet research, the District Court 
inferred that the IACP procedures are inferior to Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) 
procedures, and therefore, Dr. McCauley’s reliance upon IACP procedures warranted 
exclusion.  The District Court reasoned that Dr. McCauley’s testimony should be excluded 
because the information about the propriety of the defendant’s actions could be elicited 
“more effectively” by directly questioning the defendant officer about PSP procedures.  
App. 6.  Similarly, the District Court reasoned that Dr. McCauley’s testimony may have 
been admitted if he had referenced the PSP procedures or if he were a former Pennsylvania 




In making this determination, the District Court invaded the province of the jury.  
See Breidor, 722 F.2d at 1138-39 (noting that “the credibility and weight” of an expert’s 
testimony must “be determined by the jury, not the trial judge.”).  Whether the IACP 
procedures are the best or most well-respected police procedures is irrelevant for purposes 
of admissibility; any challenges to the “facts and assumptions” underlying Dr. McCauley’s 
testimony should have been addressed during cross-examination and weighed by the jury.  
Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 295 F.3d 408, 414 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Oddi v. 
Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2000)  (“The test of admissibility is not 
whether a particular scientific opinion has the best foundation or whether it is demonstrably 
correct.”).  I therefore conclude that the District Court did not exercise the proper 
gatekeeping function in excluding Dr. McCauley’s testimony. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
